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BOOK REVIEWS__________________________________

Women, Islam and International Law: Within the Context of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. By Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko. Leiden;Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2009. Pp. xi, 263. ISBN 978-90-04-17144-2. EU€ 104.00; US$
160.00.
Women, Islam and International La: Within the Context of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women is the eighth monograph in a series dealing with international law
issues. Each monograph is the result of academic research mainly produced
by professors and graduates of the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Hence, this
work is based on the author’s research and thesis from the Institute. Much has
been written on the role of women in Islam, especially, critical of nations
whose populations are predominantly Muslim. In this work, the criticism is in
the context of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
It is worth noting that a scholarly critique of the treatment of women
within any religion in the context of CEDAW can be made. However, Islam
seems to be a popular target of our times. It appeals to the western audience,
and it is still acceptable to view non-western women as exotic, discuss their
rights or lack thereof, and suggest ways to improve their conditions with the
implication being that they are the victims and we (in the west) can rescue and
enlighten them, and democratize their societies. The author acknowledges
this view and that in the feminist literature these women are portrayed as
“victims, influenced, unable to decide, oppressed and in need of guidance and
help from the outside.” The author also recognizes that, “any discriminatory
practice is not simply a religious prescription or cultural attitude or a tradition
but rather a mixture of them.” The view that discriminatory practices stem
from a mixture of religion, culture, and tradition is rational and compelling.
However, the following statement takes a different turn: “However, since the
focus of the present research is on religious and in particular on Islam based
justifications for practices discriminatory against women, the term “Islam” is
used in the absence of a better designation of these by Islam motivated and
justified forces.” (P. 6, FN 13, emphasis added) Stating that these
discriminatory practices are “Islam motivated and justified” is essentially yet
another misinterpretation of Islam and its teachings and removes the more
influential factors from the equation, namely, culture and tradition.
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Furthermore, the misleading notion that there isn’t a better
designation for these practices/forces advances Islam’s misinterpretation. In
fact, there are many possible designations that may be even more precise,
patriarchy being one of them. The countries highlighted in chapter three are
all fundamentally patriarchal societies. Stating that the discriminatory
practices are “Islam motivated” in these patriarchal societies where culture
and tradition are so ingrained and historically precede Islam is disingenuous
and endorses stereotypes of Muslim women and Islam in particular. The
author acknowledges that “it is difficult to distinguish practices based on
tradition or custom from religious practices.” However, there seems to be
nominal effort in this work to make the distinction. As the title implies,
tradition and custom are not what are under review here. Rather, it is Islam
and the (mis)interpretation of Islamic teachings that are under review. The
author does provide a disclaimer, “It should be therefore kept in mind that
when a reference is made in this paper to one of the three notions, it implies in
most cases a reference to the mixed concept of ‘tradition, custom and
religion’. The contrary is always indicated expressly.” (P. 4, FN10) However,
the premise that the discriminatory practices are “Islam motivated and
justified” and that tradition and custom are removed from the analysis
somewhat diminishes the value of this disclaimer.
Conversely, there are some favorable qualities of this work. The
author does attempt to reference Muslim feminist scholarship beyond the
bibliography but does so insufficiently. For example, Leila Ahmed’s seminal
work, Women and Gender in Islam, is one of many examples that argue that
the oppressive practices to which women in the Middle East are subjected are
due to the prevalence of patriarchal interpretations of Islam rather than Islam
itself. There are many other Muslim scholars who have offered different
interpretations of Islamic teachings that are considerate of women’s rights.
However, disappointingly, these views are not brought into the analysis as
well; rather it is the oppressive discriminatory practices resulting from
patriarchal interpretations leading to the reservations to CEDAW. It may
have been valuable to the reader to present a more complete analysis to how
and why the reservations came about and place the reasons in their historical
and cultural context. The author advocates that,
there is a need for work to be done by modernist Muslims
themselves to persuade – or better to recall to – ordinary
Muslims that diversity of opinions, new interpretations and
constant change are integral parts of Islamic tradition; that
therefore, new visions of the status of women can be not only
brought from the outside, but also generated from within the
Islamic tradition itself. (P. 212)
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Indeed, there is such a need in the Muslim community, and, more broadly,
there is a universal need to acknowledge diversity of opinions and recognize
new interpretations of women’s rights. The author does identify some
contemporary Muslim scholars and scholarship, not so much directly in the
discussion, but more so in the extensive bibliography and the footnotes.
The author’s attempt to provide constructive criticism and promote
dialogue at least in the academic realm may be, incidentally, achieved.
Studying the reservations system to the CEDAW and the reactions of party
states to the reservations is an interesting angle. Furthermore, this work raises
some central issues that can be explored in the future and, potentially,
promote dialogue. A couple of examples include “the internal factors [of
governments and politics in Muslim States] constituting an impediment to the
further spread, development and acceptance of new visions of the status of
women in Islam,” and the extent interference into the private sphere is
necessary “to achieve de facto equality between men and women.”
Finally, this work would have to be supplemented greatly by other varied
scholarship in the field to truly promote an objective understanding and
dialogue, and ultimately bring positive change through international law.
Consequently, the comprehensive bibliography may be one of the most
beneficial parts of this work. Krivenko has gathered an impressive list of
works cited and this feature adds to this book’s reference appeal. I would
recommend this work as a supplement to an academic library with a
collection on international human rights.
Aslihan Bulut
Librarian for Foreign, Comparative, International Law
Harvard Law School Library
Cambridge, MA USA
The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law. By Albie Sachs. Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009 Pp. xiv, 306. ISBN: 978-0-19-957179-6.
UK£21.99; US$40.00.
Albie Sachs was a member of the African National Congress (ANC)
and part of an effort to overthrow the apartheid regime in South Africa. He
was detained, subjected to solitary confinement multiple times, and lost part
of his vision and his arm to a car bomb. In post-apartheid South Africa, he
served on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and was
appointed to South Africa’s first Constitutional Court. According to the book
jacket summary, this book provides “unique access to an insider’s perspective
on life as a member of a modern judiciary, and a rare glimpse into the
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workings of a judicial mind.” The summary does not prepare the reader for a
glimpse into what seems like another world of judicial decision making that
inspires awe, compassion, and understanding.
This book is not an autobiography and it is not necessarily linear.
Sachs does not describe in detail the solitary confinement, the car bomb, or
the many other unspeakable events that he and others had to endure. These
events are discussed, but only for the purpose of explaining the thought
process behind a specific judgment or opinion. The phrase “insider’s
perspective” sounds almost sinister and the summary makes the book sound
like it could be a “tell-all” about life as a member of the South African
judiciary. However, throughout the book Sachs is very respectful of the
privacy of the other members of the judiciary. He does not discuss specific
events unless they involve his thoughts or his actions.
Each chapter of the book discusses a specific topic and includes a
short, relevant excerpt from caselaw or other writings. Focusing on a specific
topic allows Sachs to give details of relevant events from his past life without
explaining them in their entirety. This works to great effect, because he is able
to use the same event in different sections and describe it from different
angles. If the solitary confinement, the car bomb, and the other difficulties
were discussed in detail at the beginning of the book, the references later in
the book would have lost their strength, or Sachs would have been forced to
retell the stories, which would have diluted their impact. Discussing the parts
of any important event as it relates to the topic of the chapter made each event
stand out separately and gave the book an overall cohesion that it might have
struggled with if they were included in great detail out of the given topical
context.
The best part about this book is the journey it takes the reader on. The
first few chapters make it seem like post-apartheid South Africa is on another
planet. The descriptions of the ideals and operation of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Constitutional Court seem unbelievable
in the current global environment. Sachs shows the struggle that many people
faced to forgive those that admitted to the crimes they committed under
apartheid. He notes that the process of the TRC allowed many people to
discover what happened to family members and friends in a way that meant
this information was not lost forever. By the beginning of chapter three, it is
clear that post-apartheid South Africa is simply an amazing example for
applying justice. This feeling continues through most of the book, and it
seems that Sachs saved some of the more realistic views and results for the
end. Towards the end of the book he shows that judgments did not always go
as expected or the way he would have liked. The later chapters helped to bring
the book back down to reality, though there is no denying that South Africa
has come a long way.
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The final chapter discussing same sex marriage is especially relevant
in the United States right now and the style describes the whole book
perfectly. Sachs discusses his thoughts and opinions on a very emotional
topic in a calm and thoughtful manner. His writing imparts a feeling of a
person narrating a story from a third person point of view even though his
feelings and opinions are the focus of the story. While this may not be an
effective method of storytelling for everyone, it works for this book. The
narration is not void of emotion or feeling; it is organized and precise.
Emotions can be useful when trying to convey a point, but words can
sometimes fail to carry a complete thought when they are muddled with
emotion. This book is written in the same way that Sachs describes writing an
opinion. While the reader is only seeing the final draft of the story he is
telling, the reader gets a feeling that beneath the refined narration is a flood of
emotion. Even if this entire book is a “lie” (see Chapter 2) it is well written
and entertaining. The style of the book makes the topic accessible to an
audience that is much broader than the legal academy or profession.
Joe Cera
Reference Librarian
Berkeley School of Law, Boalt Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA USA
Universities and Copyright Collecting Societies. By Dinusha Kishani
Mendis. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009. Pp. xvii, 258. ISBN: 978-906704-298-7. UK. £:38.00; US$85.00.
Copyright law in most countries provides automatic, long-lasting
monopolies over creative works to their authors. To reduce the transaction
costs involved in requesting, receiving, and paying for copyright permissions,
authors have joined into collective copyright management organizations.
These organizations provide a centralized place for users of copyrighted
material to pay for and receive the licenses they need to legally use the
materials. The license fees are then distributed to the publishers and authors.
In this book, Dinusha Kishani Mendis, a Lecturer in Law at the
University of Central Lancashire, UK, examines the relationship between
these copyright licensing organizations, or copyright collecting societies, and
UK institutions of higher education. His conclusion is that while copyright
collecting societies are an efficient mechanism for distributing copyright
licenses, their largely monopolistic hold over the copyright permission market
has enabled them to charge educational institutions too much while not giving
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schools needed flexibility in their licenses. He also argues that the societies
are not transparent in their distributions to authors, preventing authors from
knowing if they are receiving fair remuneration for their creative work.
Mendis proposes that the UK higher education system move to a model based
on the Higher Education Resources On-Demand project that enables more
flexible educational access to copyrighted materials and that academic
publishing in journals be funded through publishing fees paid out of research
funds. The scholarly literature would then be largely open access, with
reproduction permissions handled through a blanket license that permits
educational reproduction, digitization, and use in course packs.
Much of the book details the history of copyright and its effect on
higher education. The first hundred pages walk the reader through the birth of
copyright law as we know it in the Statute of Anne and how colleges and
universities adapted to copyright as higher education dramatically expanded
in the 1960s. Using cases from Australia, the UK, and Canada, Mendis then
explores the factors courts consider when deciding when schools are liable for
copyright infringement by students and staff. Mendis discusses relevant cases,
legislation, and government reports in close detail.
Mendis then turns his attention to copyright collecting societies,
explaining how obtaining copyright permissions on a case-by-case basis
imposes prohibitive transaction costs. The need for an efficient means of
gathering needed licenses led to the development of centralized societies that
can take advantage of economies of scale. Mendis argues that while these
societies have gained near monopolist control of the copyright licensing
market in their respective countries, adding competing societies to the market
is unlikely to save schools money because transaction costs would increase by
dealing with multiple organizations.
Mendis contends that collecting societies do not adequately benefit
the authors whose work the societies license. He offers the UK Copyright
Licensing Agency (CLA) as an example, delving into the CLA's annual
reports to show that the society's accounting and reporting practices make it
difficult for authors to understand how royalty fees are collected and
disbursed. Rather than working for the interests of educational institutions or
scholarly authors, collecting societies seem to benefit the academic and
corporate publishers that produce monographs and journals.
The penultimate chapter seems to be a digression on open access to
scholarship, reviewing the serials crisis in libraries and more liberal copyright
licenses. However, this final thread is tied together with Mendis's proposal
that more scholarly publishing be made open access and paid for with
publishing fees taken out of research funding. These proposals seem to be
directed at government and major private research funding bodies and the UK

2010]

BOOK REVIEWS

241

higher education consortium that negotiates blanket copyright licenses with
the CLA.
The book provides a thorough history of UK copyright and higher
education and would be a useful resource for researchers exploring these
topics. Mendis thoroughly lays out the procedural history of legislative,
judicial, and administrative decisions and completely documents his sources
with footnotes. An extensive bibliography and tables of cases and legislation
round out the volume.
The primary weakness of the book is that the generous use of large
block quotes and sentences in the passive voice interrupts the text's flow and
distracts the reader from the book's arguments. Notwithstanding this weakness
of presentation, the book is most suitable for collections focusing on
European and comparative copyright law. Researchers looking into European
higher education are also likely to find material of interest.
Benjamin J. Keele
Reference Librarian
William & Mary Law School
Williamsburg, VA USA
Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective. Edited by
Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann. Dundee: Dundee University
Press, 2009. Pp. lxvi, 614. ISBN 978-1-84586-027-1. UK£50.00.
Some books deliver less than the title promises. Rights of Personality
in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective delivers much more. It amply
covers the Scots law on personality rights and provides a comparative
perspective on this law. However, it also is a major work identifying,
analyzing, and critiquing the law concerning personality rights in common
law, civil law, and mixed jurisdictions.
While not unknown to legal scholars in England, the United States,
and other countries where the common law prevails, the concept of
“personality rights” is more familiar to the jurists of civilian and “mixed”
legal systems. Scotland has a mixed legal system drawing upon both common
law and uncodified civil law. The civil law has tended to recognize “rights”
and then fashion a legal remedy for infringement of a right. The common
law, in contrast, offers a remedy only within the context of specific causes of
action whose requirements must be satisfied. As Niall Whitty states,
“Personality interests do not align exactly with the delicts [torts] which
protect those interests.”
The book’s initial description of “rights of personality” is that they
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encompass the rights which protect “who a person is rather than what a person
has.” Whitty provides a “working” list of specific personality rights: (i) the
right to life; (ii) the rights to bodily integrity and to personal security; (iii) the
right to physical liberty; (iv) the right to reputation (esteem of others); (v) the
right to dignity in the narrow sense (self-esteem, honor, and freedom from
insult); (vi) the right to privacy (seclusion from intrusion); (vii) the right to
informational privacy (non-disclosure of private information); (viii) the right
to identity (image); (ix) the right to publicity, appropriation of image, and
reification of rights to privacy and image; (x) the moral right to copyright; (xi)
the right to autonomy; (xii) personality rights in family relationships; and
(xiii) personality rights after death.
A less expansive concept of personality rights is that they involve
primarily rights to privacy, dignity, identity, and control over one’s creations
and accomplishments, which fall within items (v) through (x) of this list. It is
these rights that the book focuses on. There is also material on the right to
reputation, which has been protected by liability for defamation, and
autonomy rights (principally in the context of medical practice).
The book contains twelve chapters written by distinguished academic
authors from Scotland, England, Continental Europe, and South Africa. The
first chapter, presented by the volume’s editors Niall Whitty and Reinhard
Zimmermann, provides an overview that identifies rights of personality, their
status in Scottish, English, and European law, and key issues pertaining to the
future development of personality rights in Scotland. These issues include
options for the protection of personality rights and the impact of incorporation
of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK domestic law. Most
of the options discussed involve judicial development of Scots law rather than
legislation. Whitty and Zimmermann find a “modern need to affirm and
protect a right of privacy.” Article 8 of the ECHR has been interpreted to
require legal protection of privacy from intrusion by non-governmental as
well as governmental actors. However, it does not require any particular form
of protection or remedy.
Subsequent chapters focus upon historic and present-day Scots law;
protection of personality interests in major civilian systems of Continental
Europe (France, Germany, and Italy); personality rights in South Africa—a
mixed common law/civil law jurisdiction in which rights to personal dignity
have gained recognition; English law’s protection of privacy and “publicity”
or “image” rights; the application of intellectual property law to personality
rights in England and other common law jurisdictions; and autonomy and
dignity as elements of UK medical law. One chapter presents a “database”
comparing the structure and content of personality rights law in a number of
common law, civil law, and mixed legal systems.
The two chapters presenting an essentially common law view of
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personality rights are concerned primarily with economic interests, including
a celebrity’s interest in controlling the exploitation of the celebrity’s fame or
image. There is also some consideration of interests in limiting disclosure and
use of personal information and preventing commercial exploitation. Hazel
Carty discusses how these interests are protected by the tort of passing off and
the action for breach of confidence. David Vaver, in an especially lively
contribution to the book, considers the extent to which intellectual property
law, specifically the law of trade mark, copyright, moral rights and passing
off, does or should protect individual characteristics such as one’s name,
voice, image and persona (adopted character). He believes that intellectual
property’s “biggest problem for personality” is that personality interests attach
to the person and cannot be transferred, whereas intellectual property is
usually a “commodity” that can be transferred, bought and sold.
At several points in the book there are references to the four privacy
torts that have become embedded in American law1 and the right of publicity.2
But notably absent from the book is substantial text on protection of
personality rights in the United States. (An expected contribution from the
United States was thwarted by Hurricane Katrina.) There is much literature
available on the American privacy torts and right of publicity and it is
unlikely that Scots law would incorporate the specific categories of liability
that have developed in the United States, so the absence from the book of
substantial material on American law is not a major deficiency. However, an
American contribution probably would have discussed the extent to which
freedoms of speech and press limit liability for infringement of personality
interests and caused more to be written by other contributors on the role these
freedoms have or should have in framing personality rights. The legal
doctrines presented in the book and suggestions for future development could
not be accepted in the United States without allowing much more freedom to
publish truthful information and original creative works. The allocation of
liability for invasion of privacy to four specific categories has come under
renewed criticism. Material in the book will be valuable to American scholars
in supporting some of the criticism and identifying alternatives that might be
incorporated into American law.
The book grew out of an international conference on personality
rights, but it is more a collective treatise on personality rights law than a
collection of conference papers. As in the typical treatise, there is a table of
cases, table of legislation, and list of secondary works cited. The depth of
1

Appropriation of name or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, publicizing a private
matter, and false light publicity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E
(1977).
2
RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-47 (1995).
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research undertaken to write the book is indicated by the length of the tables
and breadth of the sources cited, as well as by what is found in the footnotes
of each chapter. The book will be quite useful and stimulating as a basis for
further research and writing on rights of personality, not just in Scotland but
in many other places around the globe.
Peter B. Kutner
Hugh Roff Professor of Law
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Norman, OK USA
The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and Future
Prospects. By Rex J. Zedalis. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009. Pp. 335. ISBN 978-0-521-76661-6. UK£59.00; US$90.00.
The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and
Future Prospects is a thoroughly researched analysis of Iraqi energy law. It is
written by Professor Rex J. Zedalis from the University of Tulsa, College of
the Law. Prof. Zedalis has written numerous other articles and books on the
legal issues surrounding oil and gas in the Middle East.3 His expertise is
evident as he explains the historical and current legal situation in Iraq, and
suggests what the future legal landscape might look like in Iraq.
The publisher asserts in the front matter pages that Legal Dimensions
of Oil and Gas in Iraq “is the first and only comprehensive examination of
current and future legal principles designed to govern oil and gas activity in
Iraq.” This seems to be an accurate claim. There are other books about Iraqi
oil and gas law, but none that seem as current and as detailed
The book is divided into three parts covering: 1) the historical
background, 2) the current legislative framework, and 3) the future. Each of
the three parts is divided into well-organized and clearly written chapters, and
each chapter is self-contained with a short introduction, followed by a detailed
analysis, and a conclusion. It is a book that one can read from cover to cover,
or use as a research tool by looking for specific topics or legal issues covered
in one or two chapters.

3

The author also recently published the book Claims against Iraqi Oil and
Gas: Legal Considerations and Lessons Learned. These two books complement each
other well and could be considered companion publications, but this review only
covers The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and Future.
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The goal of part one of the book is to state the relevant facts and the
applicable law. Thus, chapter one provides a historical overview of the facts
about the legal status of Iraqi oil and gas and is followed in chapter two by an
introduction to, and commentary on, the relevant Iraqi constitutional
provisions.
Part two is particularly useful for those seeking to understand both the
practical and theoretical aspects of current oil and gas law in Iraq. The
purpose of this part of the book is to identify and analyze legislation that
supplements the general principles of oil and gas law outlined in the Iraqi
Constitution and to understand how these laws are manifested in oil and gas
development agreements in Iraq. This section describes both federal
legislation such as the federal oil and gas framework law and regional
implementations of legislative measures such as the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s Oil and Gas Law. In part two, the author also analyses the
federal revenue sharing law, the impact of reorganizing the government’s
Ministry of Oil, and the measures reconstituting the Iraq National Oil
Company.
The third part of the book deals with current legal issues and the legal
problems that may arise in the future. Chapters in this section are organized
around specific legal issues such as the claims of foreign creditors after the
expiration of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that protect
Iraqi oil and gas from creditor nations. This section also addresses the
potential legal ramifications if any of the following should happen: 1) the
framework law fails, 2) the proposed laws on revenue sharing are abandoned,
or 3) Iraq does not effectively transition to a single autonomous nation-state.
The book has an adequate index, but it would be more useful for legal
research if it was a bit more detailed. For example, the index has an entry for
“Iraqi Constitution” listing over 120 different page numbers. It would be
more useful if it was broken down by constitutional article so that the reader
could quickly find all of the pages discussing a specific section of the
Constitution. This is also true of index entries for other oil and gas laws. The
index listing for “oil and gas framework law” shows over 80 different entries,
which is good because the reader knows that the coverage is extensive, but the
general nature of the index entry makes it hard to focus on a specific section,
article, or annex of the law. Although a researcher could mine the extensive
footnotes in this book to find citations to sources of law relevant to Iraqi oil
and gas issues, the book has no formal bibliography of resources for addition
research. Having such a listing of resources would be useful to researchers.
It would also be helpful if the author had included a table of relevant laws or
at least a table showing all of the laws cited in the book.
The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and
Future Prospects is an impressive book. It covers an evolving topic about a
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country going through a major political transition. Anyone with a passing
interest in Middle East energy law, or an urgent need for detailed information
about the legal structure surrounding the oil and gas industry in Iraq, should
consult this book. It provides an excellent starting point for anyone interested
in the historical context, current status, or possible future of Iraqi energy law.
Thus, it is a good choice for a college, university, or law school library. It is
also an excellent book for business executives, government officials, lawyers,
and others involved with any legal issue surrounding the oil and gas industry
in Iraq. As the future unfolds in Iraq, the disposition of the country’s oil and
gas reserves will be an important component in the evolution of Iraqi law, and
the political and economic development of Iraq. This book will serve as a
useful guide as Iraq moves forward.
Legal Dimensions is clearly organized and easy to read, even if one
isn’t an expert in the field. However, the book goes into tremendous detail
and is heavily footnoted so that it does cover the subject in depth.
Vincent Moyer & Catherine Deane
Foreign, Comparative & International Law Department
Hastings College of the Law Library
San Francisco, CA USA
The Law in Crisis: The Ecstatic Subject of Natural Disaster. By Ruth A.
Miller. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-80476256-4. Pp. 238. US$60.00.
Law in Crisis is one of a handful of titles in Stanford University
Press’s Cultural Lives of Law series. Books in the series “take up the
challenges posed as boundaries collapse between as well as within cultures,
and as the circulation of legal meanings becomes more fluid.” Knowing this, a
prospective reader can safely expect a degree of confusion, which is after all
one of the explicit themes of the series. Law in Crisis redoubles the prospect,
for its thesis is that legal responses to disasters and other “states of exception”
—confusing situations to begin with—establish a legal baseline, a normative
subject of law and politics, by recourse to the emergence of “ecstatic
subjects”—confused people on the margins, some suffering physical or
mental injury, some barely living or already dead. Moreover, this topsy-turvy
state of affairs in turn informs more ordinary realms of law, such as a run-ofthe-mill tort dispute. Law in Crisis is indisputably replete with collapsed
boundaries, fluid meanings, and challenges aplenty. Unfortunately, even when
it doesn’t simply infuriate and perplex with manifold lapses of logic and style,
it ultimately fails as an argument. The thesis is stated and restated repeatedly
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throughout the text, evidence is marshaled, but weakly applied, and the upshot
is an ironically meaningless treatment of disasters and crises as cultural
phenomena. The irony inheres in the book’s express design to instruct the
reader about how disasters acquire meaning, whatever that means.
Author Ruth A. Miller is a professor of Middle Eastern History whose
work encompasses gender and legal studies. Law in Crisis manifests her
interdisciplinary interests. Miller culls evidence about historical disasters
around the world from official, scholarly, and journalistic accounts in multiple
languages. She draws on cultural and philosophical critical work produced
largely during the late twentieth century (Giorgio Agamben, Rosi Braidotti,
Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, et al.), including an occasional foray into
feminist theory. Her legal analytical skills, however, are not robust. In even
the most cursory reading of a famous ruling by then Judge Cardozo,
Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital,4 it is plain to see that the
outcome of the case, turning on the inapplicability of respondeat superior to
charity hospitals such as the defendant, would not have been any different had
the fact or origin of the plaintiff’s nervous condition been left out of the
record. Yet Miller implies otherwise, arguing that Mrs. Schloendorff’s
condition resulted from her having survived the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake (a disaster), that medical and legal authorities two years later
perceived her as hysterical (and therefore ecstatic), and that the law thus saw
fit to immunize the hospital from liability for battery when doctors removed
her uterus without her consent. Miller’s attempt to explain her unorthodox
treatment of the law in a book purportedly about the law gives little
satisfaction:
Although the cases, statutes, codes, and regulations that
compose the legal doctrine of disaster play a significant part
in my argument, I pay equal attention to the literary and
cultural discourse of disaster law—and deliberately ignore the
boundaries that are thought to exist between legal texts with
legal meaning and cultural texts with cultural meaning. (P.
25)
In fact, primary sources for the “legal doctrine of disaster” (a misnomer, but
the intention seems fairly clear) are by no means given attention equal to that
shone on non-legal sources. Despite her effort to characterize legal and
cultural meanings as fungible, most of the discussion is of a vaguely cultural
or philosophical variety. Her claim that her “working definition of disaster
law is simultaneously legal, cultural, political, and literary production of the
subject in crisis” serves only to justify the refusal to police borders between
those species of discourse. (As will be seen, Miller is not averse to resolving
4

211 N.Y. 125 (1914).
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either/or problems she poses with a convenient both/and.) Consequently, for
Miller a conclusion about the cultural or political aspects of an event is ipso
facto a legal conclusion. This would not per se be an illegitimate corollary to
her thesis, but Miller fails to demonstrate how it is so. Instead, and apropos of
the mission of Cultural Lives of Law, she simply “ignore[s] the boundaries
that are thought to exist.”
The book commences with a first chapter introduction of salient terms
and themes: ecstasy, subjectivity, disaster, post-Cartesian epistemology.
Miller defines these and other critical terms by erring on the side of
inclusiveness. Thus, ecstasy depicts all manner of outsiders and injured
people, not merely those who manifest an affect of rapture or frenzy. This
looseness of definition permits her to identify ecstatic subjects where none
exist. If corpses themselves exhibit ecstasy, as she holds, then virtually
anything, let alone anybody, could be an ecstatic subject. Further troubles
arise in the second chapter, which examines the rhetoric of historical and
recent writings about disaster, particularly in terms of metaphors they
commonly invoke, two important ones for Miller being centrality (of locations
where disasters occur) and coherence (of the rational subject), figures that
turn out to represent to Miller a “specious rationality that in the past has led so
frequently to the demolition or coercive re-creation of political identities.” In
chapter 2, Miller introduces her own recurrent metaphorical theme, that of
endowment (of meaning), here used in one of the many restatements of the
book’s thesis: “I analyze the ways in which, historically, various earthquakes
have been endowed with meaning, and I make the case that a disaster’s
political meaning has been determined via the production and invocation of
the subject in ecstasy.” In dutiful scholarly fashion, Miller routinely
telegraphs when she is about to “make the case that” such-and-such is the
case, yet too often it goes unmade. A subject in ecstasy is produced or
invoked, a political meaning is asserted. The reader must take Miller’s word
that one is a significant concomitant of the other. Similarly, Miller never
specifies what it means to endow a disaster with meaning. Meaning requires
context. Yet having deliberately dispensed with the boundaries that define
contexts, Miller can’t then simply proclaim meanings floating free of any
contexts (or, conversely, meanings situated equally among all contexts).
A variation of this circular argument that tries to have it both ways
occurs in this second chapter, but also throughout the book, when Miller
makes claims about the intelligibility of disasters: “What I suggest . . . is thus,
first, that politics and disaster are far too entangled to address separately, and
second, that both disasters and the political structures that develop out of them
become intelligible only via reference to the ecstatic, eccentric subject.”
Leaving aside the obviously falsifiable first premise—disasters and the
politics of disaster are widely addressed separately and intelligibly so, even
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though one will of course have implications for the other—it is simply not
sufficient to proclaim that a disaster has become intelligible in order to make
it so. The intelligibility she proclaims ostensibly only arises “via reference to
the ecstatic, eccentric subject.” Hence, there is a disaster and a coincidental
reference to such a subject in an account of the disaster. That simply is what it
means for a disaster to be intelligible or meaningful. QED, but your mileage
may vary.
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters focus respectively on body parts
and fluids, corpses and the bodies of the near dead, and public sites of
emergency and its aftermath, primarily camps and cemeteries. Given the
book’s horrific subject, such lurid topics are not out of place, but Miller’s
relentless invocation of them seems gratuitous at times. These chapters plumb
the historical literature for case studies of disasters, yet inevitably resort to the
same sorts of fallacious, question-begging ipse dixits illustrated from the
second chapter. For example, in a passage in chapter 3, Miller states that
“capital punishment . . . is nothing more nor less than an ordinary, everyday
manifestation of disaster law . . .”. By the conclusion of chapter 5, she regards
capital punishment as “the most apparently extraordinary law.” How does she
achieve this radical revision? She explains that “[t]he catastrophic and the
ordinary are not discrete arenas, and once we acknowledge their continuity,
we must also acknowledge the impossibility of pinpointing the distinct
moment of transition from one to the other.” But the purpose of the book had
never been to embark on a solution to the Sorites paradox, to note precisely
the “distinct moment” when one additional grain of sand turns a mere
assortment into a heap. Instead, the both/and solution dissolves the either/or
dilemma.
Other examples suggest Miller has a propensity to paraphrase
unfaithfully, even exaggerate, the work of others to propel her argument.
Again in the conclusion to chapter 5, during a discussion of how public spaces
and ceremonies “produce” political subjects, she quotes a contemporary
journalistic account of the San Francisco earthquake. The journalist, James
Russell Wilson, wrote that “‘weddings in great number resulted from the
disaster. Women, driven out of their homes and left destitute, appealed to the
men to whom they were engaged, and immediately marriages were effected.’”
(P.170)5 Miller takes Wilson to be stating that “it was precisely that most
disquieting of public/private ceremonies, the wedding, that characterized San
Francisco’s postearthquake squares and plazas . . .”. (P.171) But the text she
quotes from Wilson makes no such claims. In an endnote to this discussion,
Miller compounds the misreading. There she remarks that “Bataille . . . argues
5

Quoting James Russell Wislon, San Francisco’s Horror of Earthquake and Fire
(New York: G.W. Bertron, 1906) 194.
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that transgression ‘persists at the very basis of marriage,’ that the marriage
ceremony is in fact no different from the blood sacrifice: ‘laws that allow an
infringement and consider it legal are paradoxical. Hence, just as killing is
simultaneously forbidden and performed in sacrificial ritual, so the initial
sexual act constituting marriage is a permitted violation’.” (P. 218, n.127)6
Given Miller’s evident scholarly fascination for the ghoulish, Bataille’s
relegation to a solitary note is remarkable. But the use to which she puts his
excerpted words is unfortunate. Plainly, Bataille is not describing the liminal
status of marriage ceremonies, but that of “the initial sexual act constituting
marriage.” Yet this association of marriage with blood sacrifice serves to
bolster Miller’s attribution to Wilson respecting the “disquieting” aspect of
weddings.
To be fair, Miller did not exactly set out to produce a purely logical
argument. Rather, she seems to want to propose a suggestion about a vaguely
symbiotic relationship between marginalized people and official or cultural
responses to disastrous events, something to the effect that beneath the
appearance of ordinary, mundane, bureaucratic procedures triggered in an
emergency resides a reality consisting of extraordinary, exceptional,
“ecstatic” phenomena. Put another way, she seems to want to demonstrate that
rationality, as represented by such political icons as the modern liberal subject
or stable, orderly public monuments, is in fact always vulnerable to the
irrational, the disorderly, unpredictable propensities of people and states. She
tries to show that the two modes somehow depend on each other and, perhaps
counter-intuitively, that a state’s basis for legal or political action is in fact
bound up with the irrational more so than its complement. If her point is
simply that despite our pretensions we can never exercise a pure rationality,
that the unpredictable lurks around every corner, even in the most mundane
circumstances, then it is an unremarkable one. But her incessant and brooding
intonation of her thesis betrays Miller’s subscription to a blunt Foucauldian
naïveté, a notion that law or power operates insidiously and everywhere,
especially where darkness and decay proliferate.
Stylistically, Miller too often improperly uses common, seemingly
innocuous phrases deployed in ordinary scholarly argument that import the
force of logic or clarity even when none is apparent, “that is” being a signal
instance in this exemplary sentence: “Disease, that is, proves the existence of
an earthquake even if there is no other indication that an earthquake actually
happened.” (P. 75) Miller is here relating a position she either ascribes to or
extrapolates from Noah Webster. In the preceding paragraph, she had made a
similar ascription: “According to Webster, ‘considerable plague’ is . . . always
6

Quoting Georges Bataille, Tears of Eros (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1989)
109-10.
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the result of ‘convulsions of the earth’ . . .”. (P .75)7 But the passage in which
she quotes Webster states that “it is indeed difficult to find ‘an instance of a
considerable plague, in any country . . . which has not been immediately
preceded or accompanied with convulsions of the earth’” (P. 74)8 Difficulty
finding a “considerable” outbreak of disease unconnected to earthquake does
not even suggest, let alone establish, the inevitability of their direct
coincidence. If her point has been to illustrate how a medical or marginally
legal discourse surrounding disease and earthquakes has associated the two to
an extent that goes beyond merely noting their frequent coincidence, then
Webster doesn’t serve as a suitable illustration. She cannot reasonably
conclude, as she does, that Webster stands for the proposition that “[w]hat we
have here, in other words, is a situation in which if there is considerable
plague in a certain region or among a certain population, there must also have
been an earthquake that prompted the disease . . .”. (P. 75) Yet with a coyly
placed “that is,” she dispenses with Webster’s (and his reviewer’s) text and
substitutes her own implausible generalization as “proof.”9
7

Purportedly quoting Noah Webster, “A Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential
Diseases,” 3 The Medical Repository of Original Essays and Intelligence (1800) 278,
283. It bears mentioning that the publication to which Miller cites was not composed
by Webster. It is, rather, a review in a medical journal of a book published by
Webster in 1799. Miller attributes to Webster a blockquote reproduced on p.74 of
Law in Crisis, but these are the words of the unidentified reviewer. Later, the
reviewer reproduces a long excerpt of Webster’s own words, some of which Miller
also quotes and attributes to Webster (e.g., the reference to “considerable plague”).
8
Quoting Webster [sic], p.283.
9
Miller fails to mention that the second sentence following the reference to
“considerable plague” in Webster’s text excerpted in the review reads, “It does not
happen that every place where pestilence prevails is shaken; but during the progress
of the diseases which I denominate pestilence, and which run, in certain periods, over
large portions of the globe, some parts of the earth, and especially those which
abound most with subterranean fire, are violently agitated.” (Webster [sic], P. 283)
Nor does she point out the reviewer’s own concluding remarks respecting Webster’s
analysis:
We have no hesitation to admit, that the frequent coincidence of
these great phenomena, as stated by Mr. Webster, is a most
interesting fact in the order of nature. Enough has been observed to
stimulate inquiry to the utmost; and it is to be hoped, that incessant
attention will be directed to this object, until our discoveries
concerning it become more satisfactory and complete. We may,
however, be permitted to remark, that it is requisite to know much
more of nature before we can hope to ascertain the precise degree of
connection or dependence of these occurrences upon one another;
whether they stand in the relation of cause and effect, or whether
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Other similarly misused common phrases include, predominantly,
“therefore,” “thus,” and “in other words” (as in the foregoing Webster
example). The text abounds with these superficially scholarly indicia of
transitional stages of an argument, phrases that could charitably be read as
serving only to mark a paraphrase or qualify an inference. Misapplied
adverbs, such as “arguably” and “precisely”—the former a symptom of
waffling, the latter a device for striking emphasis often overused in so-called
critical writing of the late twentieth century—serve a like effect, as do
frequent passive constructions (“endowed with meaning” being the mode).
These usages tend to mask the absence of a thought process that operates
according to some more rigorous principle than free association or mistaking
correlation with causation.
Miller’s concluding chapter reads like a last ditch attempt to
synthesize and culminate themes from the foregoing chapters, to compose
ideas that resolve the lingering questions about what it means for disasters to
have meaning endowed by ecstatic subjects who have been produced by the
intervention of a law pertaining to disasters. At the same time, it serves as an
apologia for the failure to do so. “[T]he violence does not disappear. But a
new vocabulary for addressing it does become possible.” (P.182) A “new
vocabulary” is for Miller a source of “optimism” (P.178) respecting at least
two sorts of violence: the historical violence resulting from natural disasters
or other states of exception, and also a metaphorical violence conveyed by the
“indefinable and unbounded” (p.182) ecstatic subject, whose shattered being
reflects, all for the good, an irreparable rift cleaving the metaphysical plane.
Miller’s optimism is either misplaced or cynical, for it “in no way . . . sees in
the future some end to political violence . . .” (p.178); instead, it celebrates
subjects in ecstasy—victims of disasters and of government mismanagement
of disaster response—because they “have unique access to political truth and
reality” and they “insist on being heard.” (P.178) It is difficult not to read
these assertions as euphemisms, polite ways of affording respect to people
who heretofore have populated page after page as cadavers or diseased and
dismembered bodies on the brink of death, depicted in terms of the lowliest
abjection.
At the outset of the book, Miller alluded to feminist theory, but then
for the most part ignores it, despite her claim that she “both implicitly and
explicitly relied on the insights and methodologies provided by feminist
theory throughout this book.” (P.179) This is a dubious claim, and the absence
they may all be considered as effects of a common cause. (Webster
[sic], P. 287)
Is it unfair to suggest that Miller’s scholarship here is at best sloppy?
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of more explicit reliance on feminist theory is perhaps regrettable. Many of
the anecdotes marshaled as historical evidence in the book’s chapters could
indeed have been examined productively by a critique grounded in
dimensions of gender. (She levels one in her account of Mrs. Schloendorff’s
case, an easy target, but even then misses the opportunity to highlight
Cardozo’s condescending dismissal of the nursing profession in his
opinion.10) In her conclusion, she attempts to salvage feminism for her thesis,
reciting a cento of sundry theorists whose work has associations with
feminism and gender theory, and noting their not implausible similarities with
her ideas about disasters and ecstatic subjects. She might also have noted that
the source of her optimism, the shattered subjects’ purportedly unique access
to truth and their insistence on being heard, resonates with a tried and true,
early and ubiquitous second wave feminist goal to “give voice to communities
that remain on the margins” (here as it’s currently expressed on the blog
Feminist Review, evidently not connected to the longstanding interdisciplinary
journal of the same name). Although this may attest to Miller’s feminist
pedigree, it is by now a fairly worn, not to mention more than a little
condescending, tribute to the women nominally intended to benefit from the
cause.
It is not too cynical to acknowledge that a kind of skillful misreading
is a paradigm of scholarly argument and persuasion, particularly in the
humanities, where one goal is to trigger a reader’s reflex emotional responses.
Indeed, an important component of preparation to be an effective lawyer was
once a rigorous training in the rhetorical arts, a discipline focused on
oratorical skills and the persuasive utility of the strengths and weaknesses of
language, both its capacity for emphatic expressiveness and its unsettling
ambiguities. Readers can appreciate in argument an artful deployment of
language as well as a lucid logic, and some are even willing to tolerate a
slightly obscure logic for the sake of relishing an especially marvelous
passage of eloquence. But where neither is in the offing, the reader is
stranded. Although its topic is provocative—an account of moments when the
bizarre and eccentric upstage the mundane and tedious incidentals of law
could be rewarding—and despite the varied texts comprising its historical
apparatus, both the logical and the rhetorical wherewithal of Law in Crisis are
10

“There may be cases where a patient ought not to be advised of a contemplated
operation until shortly before the appointed hour. To discuss such a subject at
midnight might cause needless and even harmful agitation. About such matters a
nurse is not qualified to judge. She is drilled to habits of strict obedience. She is
accustomed to rely unquestioningly upon the judgment of her superiors. No woman
occupying such a position would reasonably infer from the plaintiff's words that it
was the purpose of the surgeons to operate whether the plaintiff forbade it or not.”
Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 134.
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slight. Its misreadings seem more willful than skillful, and the reader is not
likely to find its stylistic tics suitable compensation for its circumventions of
logic.
Dean C. Rowan
Reference & Research Services Director
Berkeley School of Law, Boalt Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA USA
Judicial Review in EU Law. By Alexander H. Türk. Cheltenham;
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009, Pp. xlvii, 354. ISBN: 978-184542-203-5. UK£95.00; US$170.00.
In Judicial Review in EU Law, Alexander H. Türk endeavors to
provide a "more balanced picture" than that of his colleagues. He argues at
the outset that other academics have been reactionary in their descriptions of a
European Court of Justice that wants to bar as many private individuals from
its halls as possible. This initially haughty tone fades as Türk largely delivers
on his promise of balance and explores different avenues to judicial review in
the European Union's legal system.
Judicial Review in EU Law makes clear for the reader the most
important cases on this subject area and their effects. Its detailed approach
makes it a worthwhile, if daunting, resource for understanding the role of
courts in European Union law. The book’s biggest drawback is that its
analysis dates from August 2008. It is a product of a pre-Lisbon Treaty era,
and the vestigial terminology might confuse a reader unfamiliar with these
aspects of European Union history.
The book is divided into chapters covering the different paths and
implications of judicial review, a helpful organizational scheme. As Türk
explains, judicial review in the European Union has most often occurred
under Article 230 and Article 232 of the EC Treaty. Article 230 gave rise to
actions for annulment of Community acts, and discussion of this area covers
roughly half of Judicial Review in EU Law. The different types of reviewable
acts are outlined in detail, and Türk goes into great depth on the treatment of
privileged, semi-privileged, and non-privileged applicants. Less time is spent
on the consequences of illegality under Article 231 and Article 233, as well as
the timing requirements of Article 230(5).
There is also a briefer study of actions for “failure to act” under
Article 232. Türk goes into the ramifications of the requirement of “legal
effects” for Article 232 actions, including special results for non-adoption of
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preparatory acts. He also discusses incidental review, an option for nonprivileged private parties under Articles 234 and 241 of the EC Treaty. Türk
describes incidental review as an even greater uphill battle, though one much
simplified after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
The final two sections of Judicial Review in EU Law focus on noncontractual liability and interim relief. Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty sets
out liability for acts attributable to European Community (now European
Union) institutions. Türk references the relevant cases covering both the tests
for liability of the institution and assignment of joint liability to the institution
and any member state. Interim relief during the process of judicial review
was made available under Articles 242 and 243 of the EC Treaty (now
Articles 278 and 279 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union). Article 242 allowed for the temporary suspension of an act’s
enforcement during review, and Article 243 allowed for new temporary
measures to be taken until review was completed. Türk sketches out the
requirements and procedures for these two options for interim relief.
Judicial Review in EU Law suffers from being written (but not
published) before the Lisbon Treaty took effect. Changes as basic as
nomenclature and as important as the structure of the court system rendered
the book’s content somewhat dated even before its publication. Anticipating
this problem, Türk examines the Lisbon Treaty in each section and suggests
what changes could come to pass after it. Actions for annulment might
feature more private parties as plaintiffs, but Türk remains skeptical of too
much progress in this area. He asserts any standing liberalization would be
“modest,” but also explains some of the ways the pillar structure’s removal in
the proposed Constitutional Treaty (and eventual Lisbon Treaty) would add
several new areas of reviewable acts. Türk also argues that grants of interim
relief and actions for failure to act will remain largely unchanged.
By the conclusion of Judicial Review in EU Law the reader has gained not
only a thorough understanding of the case law on the subject but also an idea
as to what changes may come to pass now that the Lisbon Treaty has been
adopted. While a more current update on the topic might be even more
useful, this book is valuable enough for any international law collection.
Jacob E. Sayward
Serials Librarian
Leo T. Kissam Memorial Library
Fordham University School of Law
New York, NY USA

